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[L. A. No. 23728. In Bank. Nov. 29, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ONE 1948 CHEVROLET 
CONVERTIBLE COUPE, ENGINE NO. FAA 433685, 
Defendant; BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST 
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking 
Association), Respondent. 
[1] Poisons-Forfeiture of Vehic1e-Evidence.-In a proceeding 
to forfeit an automobile used in tl'unsporting marijuana, testi-
mony of a police officer that while four occupants were getting 
from the vehicle to the sidewalk one of them dropped a can 
containing marijuana into the bushes established by competent 
evidence, independently of any extrajudicial statements, that 
a narcotic had in fact been in the vehicle. 
[2] Id.-Forfeiture of 'W}'ehiele-Forfeiture of Lien Interests.-
Though the legal owner of an automobile seized for trans-
porting marijuana did not make the investigation of the pur-
chaser's character and moral responsibility required by Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11620, its interest is not subject to forfeiture 
in the absence of a proper forfeiture of the registered owner's 
interest, and despite the fact that she defaulted, the legal 
owner may protect its own interest by asserting any defense 
she may have had. 
[3] Id.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Knowledge of IDegal Use.-In 
order that a vehicle may be forfeited for illegal transportation 
of narcotics, it is not necessary that the registered owner know 
of the illegal use, since such use of property is so undesirable 
that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. 
[4] Id.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Purpose of Statute.-The purpose 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 50 et seq. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1, 6, 11] Poisons, § 17(5); [2, 7, 8] 
Poisons, § 17(4); [3, 4, 9] Poisons, § 17(2); [5, 10] Poisons, 
~ 17(3); [12, 13] Evidence, § 263 • 
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of the statutes authorizing the forfeiture of vehicles used 
in unlawfully transporting narcotics is to curb the drug traffic, 
and the public interest to be protected against the drug and 
its victims outweighs the loss suffered by those whose con-
fidence in others proves to be misplaced. 
['6] Id.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Car in Possession of Permittee.-
By entrusting a vehicle to her son, the registered owner accepts 
the risk that it might be used contrary to law in transporting 
narcotics. 
[6] Id. - Forfeiture of Vehicle - Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof.-When the narcotic is found on an occupant of the 
vehicle, there is no presumption or inference that the regis-
tered owner or person entrusted with the vehicle has knowl-
edge thereof, as there is when the narcotic is found on the 
person of the reglstered owner or his entrustee, and the People 
must establish by other evidence that the registered owner or 
the person entrusted with the vehicle had knowledge of the 
presence of a narcotic therein. 
[7] ld.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Forfeiture of Lien Interests.-In 
a proceeding to forfeit an automobile used in transporting 
marijuana, where the People established the driver's knowl-
edge by his plea of guilty in a prior criminal action and by his 
statement to a police inspector, such admissions were ad-
missible to forfeit the registered owner's interest and were 
therefore admissible to forfeit the legal owner's interest. 
[8] Id.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Forfeiture of Lien Interests.-
Where once a vehicle is shown to have been illegally used 
as to the registered owner, the only defense available to the 
lien claimant is Health & Saf. Code, § 11620 relating to in-
vestigation of the purchaser's character. 
[9] ld.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Nature of Proceeding.-The pro-
ceeding for forfeiture of a vehicle under Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11610, is in rem, though it is a kind of in rem proceeding in 
which the claimants to the property are entitled to a jury 
trial, and the declarations as well as the acts of the person 
in control of the vehicle bind the vehicle and thereby bind all 
claimants thereto. 
[10] Id.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Car in Possession of Permittee.-
Where the registered owner of a vehicle entrusts it to her son, 
during the time that he has the right to its possession and 
responsibility for its use he has authority to speak for it, 
and his admissions are as binding on it as hers would have 
been. (Disapproving statement in People v. One 1950 Mercury 
Sedan, 116 C.A.2d 746, 751; 254 P.2d 666, that driver's ad-
missions do not bind other claimants.) 
[lla,llb] Id.-Forfeiture of Vehicle-Evidence.-In a proceeding 
to forfeit an automobile used in transporting marijuana, the 
driver's statement to a police inspector as to his knowledge 
) 
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of the presence of a narcotic in the vehicle is admissible to 
prove his state of mind and to show his knowledge at the 
time of the arrest and seizure. 
[12] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations as to Mental Condition.-
Ordinarily a declaration of a state of mind is admissible only 
to prove the declarant's state of mind at the time of the 
declaration. 
[18] Id.-Hearsay-Declarations as to Mental Condition.-Under 
certain circumstances declarations are admissible to prove a 
state of mind at a particular time although uttered before or 
after that time, on the theory that under these particular cir-
cumstances the stream of consciousness has enough continuity 
so that the same characteristics may be found "for some dis-
tance up and down the current." 
APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. James G. Whyte, Judge. Reversed. 
Proceeding to forfeit an automobile used in transporting 
marijuana. Judgment that vehicle be forfeited to state sub-
ject to interest of legal owner, reversed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Donald D. Stoker 
and W. B. Thayer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. 
Samuel B. StewP1't, Jr., Hugo A. Steinmeyer and J.Jseph 
S. Potts for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding the People seek the 
forfeiture of an automobile for being used in violation of 
section 11610 of the Health and Safety Code. The notice of 
seizure and intended forfeiture (Health & Saf. Code, § 11612 
et seq.) was directed to Mrs. V. E. Phillips, the registered 
owner, Ronald Leon Phillips, her son, and the Bank of 
America, the legal owner. Mrs. Phillips defaulted. The bank 
answered, denying that the vehicle was used in violation of 
the narcotics laws and that any narcotic was unlawfully in 
the possession of any occupant thereof. 
The cause was tried by the court sitting without a jury. 
(See People v. One 1941 Ohevrolet Ooupe, 37 Ca1.2d 283, 
300 [231 P.2d 832].) [1] Officer Brogan of the Long Beach 
Police Department testified that on August 3, 1953, .6e and 
Officer 0 'Rourke saw the vehicle parked at the curb of a 
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 413; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 585. 
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city street near school grounds where no cars are ordinarily 
parked. Thcy decided to investigate aud found four occu-
pants in the vehicle. Clothicr was in the front seat behind 
the wheel (see People v. One 19;)1 Ford Sedan, 122 Cal.App.2d 
6~O, 691-692 [265 P.2d 170J), Dean and DeCordova were 
also in the front seat, and Phillips was in the rear seat. As 
they were getting from the vehicle to the sidewalk following 
orders of the officers, Clothier dropped a can containing 
marijuana into the bushes. 'rhe four suspects were arrested. 
and the vehicle was seized. Thus, by competent evidence, 
independently of any extrajudicial statements, the People 
proved that a narcotic had in fact been in the vehicle. (People 
v. One 1941 Buick Club Coupe, 72 Cal.App.2d 593, 596 [165 
P.2d 44J ; People v. One 1940 Buick 8 Sedan, 70 Cal.App.2d 
342, 545-546 [161 P .2d 264].) 
Phillips' plea of guilty in a criminal action for unlawful 
possession of the marijuana was admitted in evidence against 
the registered owner but was excluded as against the bank. 
(See Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Ca1.2d 586, 593-596 [191 P.2d 432] ; 
People v. One 1940 Oldsmobile Club Coupe, 80 Cal.App.2d 
372, 377-378 [181 P.2d 950] ; Langensand v. Obert, 129 Cal. 
App. 214. 218 [18 P.2d 725] ; People v. Sanderson, 129 Cal. 
App. 531, 533 [18 P.2d 982].) Inspector Doyle, the officer 
in charge of the Narcotics Division of the Long Beach Police 
Department, testified that at "2 :15 in the morning of the 
day of the arrest" he questioned the suspects and that "at a 
later time after the arrest," in the presence of Clothier and 
the other occupants of the vehicle, he had a conversation 
with Phillips, in which Phillips stated in effect that he knew 
before and at the time of the arrest and seizure that an 
occupant of the vehicle had marijuana in his possession.· 
"The testimony of the police officer as to the conversation with Phillips 
was: "I questioned Phillips as to the--in fact, I questioned him gen· 
erally as to who was the registered owner of the car. Phillips admitted 
he was. 
"I asked him to relate what had occurred in regard to purchasing 
this marijuana. Phillips stated that he had met Clothier, who was down 
here on leave from :' naval vessel which was moored at San l!'ranCiSl"O,--
which wa::l moored ill San Francisco Bay, and they had picked up the 
other party Dean, and DcCordova also was from another vessel in the 
same area, came down here to Long Beach with Clothier and he had 
agreed to drive them back to San Francisco in time to be on their vessel 
by 8:00 O'clock Monday morning, and that on the afternoon before the 
arrest they decided they would purchase some marijuana, they would 
take it to San Francisco and sell it. and that the four of them had pooled 
their funds and that he then drove the other three occupants in this ear 
to Tijuana, and there on the street, he and Clothier contacted a Mexican 
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This statement was also admitted against the registered owner 
but excluded as against the bank. 
The court found that Phillips'hau no interest in the vehicle, 
that at the time of the arrest and seizure Phillips was in 
possession of the vehicle, that it was being used to transport 
marijuana on the person of Clothier, an occupant thereof, 
that, as against the registered owner only, on the basis of the 
admissions, Phillips was aware of the presence of marijuana 
on the person of an occupant of the vehicle at the time of 
seizure. rrhe court also found that the bank had not made 
a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, charac-
ter, and reputation of the purchaser before its lien was created 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11620), that as against the bank, 
the admission of Phillips that he knew Clothier had marijuana 
at the time of the seizure was inadmissible hearsay, and that 
there being no other sufficient evidence of that fact, Phillips 
had no knowledge of the presence of any narcotic in the 
vehicle. Accordingly, judgment was entered forfeiting the 
vehicle to the state subject to the interest of the bank in the 
sum of $855.02. Since that sum was in excess of the value of 
and Clothier left with this Mexican, at which time he returned and had 
this marijuana. 
I I It was shown to them there and then Phillips was worried about 
the Customs officials finding it in his car. Clothier and DeCordova had 
their sailor uniforms in a parcel or package within the car; that they had 
decided to change into their clothes later on in the trip. They decided 
that the two boys would change into their sailor clothes, and take the 
marijuana and walk across the border ahead of the car. 'l'here would be 
less suspicion. 
I I They both agreed to it, and Clothier took the narcotics and he and 
DeCordova walked across the border. 
I I After waiting for sometime across the border, Dean came up to 
them on the United States side and told them not to get restl(lss, that 
Phillips had sent him ahead to tell them he was in the line. After Phillips 
crossed the line, he picked up the suspects and proceeded north back to 
Long Beach. 
" At a place outside of San Diego they stopped at a service station 
and Clothier got out of the car and went to the rest room at which time 
he came back and Phillips was driving, and after they left this rest 
room and got about two miles, Clothier broke out a marijuana cigarette 
which he told them he had rolled in the washroom and lit it and passed it 
around to all four of them. 
"At a placc-tll€Y weren't certain whether it was in the City limits of 
Long Beach or on the border, they stopped for a cup of coffee or 
sandwich. When they got back in the car, Phillips, having driven, Clothier 
offered to drive, and he permitted Clothier to drive the car ba$ to 
Long Beach, and Clothier did drive it, and they came back to the area 
which is north of where they were arrested, and which had been the 
original point of departure, and none of their other companions were 
around, and they drove around the block and stopped, at which time the 
police car came up to them and found them and shook them down as thoy 
took them out of tile car." 
... 
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the vehicle at the time of the seizure, it was ordered that the 
vehicle be released to the bank in satisfaction of its lien. The 
People appeal. 
[2] Even though the bank did not make the investigation 
required by section 11620, its interest is not subject to for-
teiture in the absence of a proper forfeiture of Mrs. Phillips' 
interest (People V. One 1937 Plymouth 6 4-Door Sedan, 
37 Cal.App.2d 65, 72-74 [98 P.2d 750]), and despite the fact 
that she defaulted, the bank may protect its own interest by 
asserting any defense she had to the forfeiture. (People V. 
One 1939 La Salle B Tour. Sedan, 45 Cal.App.2d 709, 713 
[115 P.2d 39].) The basic question on this appeal, therefore. 
is whether there was a proper forfeiture of Mrs. Phillips' 
interest in the vehicle. 
[3] It was not necessary that Mrs. Phillips know of the 
illegal use. ". . . certain uses of property may be regarded 
as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at 
his peril. The law thus builds a secondary defense against 
a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with 
the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the 
wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner." (Van Oster v. 
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 [47 8.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354, 47 
A.L.R. 1044].) [4] The purpose of the statutes is to curb 
the narcotic traffic, and "the public interest to be protected 
against the drug and its victims outweighs the loss suffered 
by those whose confidence in others proves to be misplaced." 
(People v. One 1941 Ford B Stake Truck, 26 Ca1.2d 503, 508 
[159 P.2d 641].) [5] By entrusting the vehicle to her son, 
Mrs. Phillips accepted the risk that it would be used contrary 
to law. (People v. One 1940 Ford V-B Coupe, 36 Ca1.2d 471, 
476 [224 P.2d 677]; People V. One 1933 Plymouth Sedan 
De Luxe Auto., 13 Ca1.2d 565, 568 [90 P.2d 799] ; People v. 
One 1951 Ford Sedan, 122 Cal.App.2d 680, 687 [265 P.2d 
176] ; Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 398. 
402 [24 L.Ed. 637] ; Van Oster v. Kansas, supra, 272 U.S. 465, 
467; J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 
U.S. 505, 512-513 [41 S.Ct. 189, 65 L.Ed. 376].) [6] When 
as in this case, the narcotic is found on an occupant of the 
vehicle, there is no presumption or inference that the regis. 
tered owner or person entrusted with the vehicle had knowl-
edge thereof (see People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe. 
28 Cal.2d 692, 695 [171 P.2d 719]) as there is when the 
narcotic is found on the person of the registered owner or 
his entrustee (People v. One 1952 Chevrolet Bel Aire, 128 
) 
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Cal.App.2d 414, 417 [275 P.2d 509]; People v. One 1940 
Ohrysler, 77 Cal.App.2d 306, 314 [175 P.2d 585]) and the 
People must establish by other evidence that the registered 
owner or the person entrusted with the vehicle had knowledge 
of the presence of a narcotic therein. (People v. One 1951 
Mercury 2-Door Sedan, 116 Cal.App.2d 692, 693-694 [254 
P.2d 140].) [7, 8] The People established that knowledge 
herein by Phillips' plea of guilty in the criminal action and 
by his statement to Inspector Doyle. These admissions were 
admissible to forfeit Mrs. Phillips' interest (for the reasons 
set forth below) and were therefore admissible to forfeit the 
bank's, for once the vehicle is shown to have been illegally 
used as to the registered owner, the only defense available to 
the lien claimants is Health and Safety Code, section 11620. 
(People v. One 1940 Ford V-B Ooupe, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 471, 
474.) 
[9] The proceeding under section 11610 is in rem (People 
v. One 1933 Plymouth Sedan De Luxe Auto., supra, 13 Ca1.2d 
565, 569), even though it is a kind of in rem proceeding in 
which the claimants to the property are entitled to a jury 
trial (People v. One 1941 Ohevrolet Ooupe, supra, 37 Ca1.2d 
283, 286, 300), and the declarations as well as the acts of 
the person in control of the vehicle bind the vehicle and 
thereby bind all claimants thereto. (Dobbins' Distillery v. 
United States, supra, 96 U.S. 395, 398-402; Interstate Se-
curities 00. v. United States, 151 F.2d 224, 226; United States 
v. One Buick Automobile, 21 F.2d 789, 790-791; United States 
v. One 1952 De Soto Olub Ooupe, 122 F.Supp. 568, 569. In 
United States v. One 1949 Pontiac Sedan, 194 F.2d 756, cert. 
den. 343 U.S. 966 [72 8.Ct. 1061, 96 L.Ed. 1363], cited for a 
contrary rule, the court declared, "However in view of our 
further conclusion the propriety of the exclusion of this evi-
dence is not decisive of the issue herein." In United States v. 
Packard Sedan, 23 F.2d 865, 869, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida reached a contrary 
result without reference to the Dobbins' Distillery case and 
similar cases.) [10] If Mrs. Phillips had been in possession of 
the vehicle and made these admissions, there could be no doubt 
that they would bind the vehicle and justify the forfeiture 
of her interest and necessarily therefore the interest of the 
bank. (People v. One 1951 Ford V-B Oustom Olub Coupe, 
119 Cal.App.2d 612, 613 [259 P.2d 693].) She entrusted the 
vehicle to Phillips. and while he had the right to its possession 
) 
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and responsibility for its use, he had authority to speak for 
it and his admissions are as binding on it as hers would have 
been. (Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, supra, 96 U.S. 
395, 398-402; United States v. One Buick Automobile, supra, 
2L. F.2d 789, 791.) The statement in People v. One 1950 
:llercury Sedan, 116 Cal.App.2d 746, 751 [254 P.2d 666], that 
the driver's admissions do not bind the other claimants was 
unnecessary to the decision therein and is disapproved.-
[11a] Even if Phillips' plea of guilty and his statement to 
Inspector Doyle were not binding on the vehicle as vicarious 
admissions, his statement to the inspector was admissible 
to prove his state of mind, i.e., his knowledge of the presence 
of a narcotic in the vehicle. Although the People did not 
state for what purpose Phillips' statement to Inspector Doyle 
was offered, the court admitted it as against Mrs. Phillips, 
the registered owner, and it is clear from the record that the 
court considered the admissibility of Phillips' statement on 
the issue of knowledge apart from the issue as to whether 
or not a narcotic was in the vehicle. The presence of a 
narcotic in the vehicle had already been proved by direct 
evidence independently of any extrajudicial statements. The 
remaining issue in the case was Phillips' knowledge, and the 
record leaves no doubt that the court considered Phillips' 
statements as offered to prove that knowledge, for it found as 
against her "on the basis of admissions of Ronald L. Phillips 
that he was aware of the presence of marijuana on the person 
of an occupant of said vehicle" but that as against the bank 
that Phillips "had no knowledge" of the presence of any 
narcotic in the vehicle. (See Cripe v. Cripe, 170 Cal. 91, 94 
[148 P. 520].) 
[12] Ordinarily a declaration of a state of mind is ad-
missible only to prove the declarant's state of mind at the 
·In that case the forensic chemist" would not say that these were the 
same cigarettes that he examined in his laboratory and that the specific 
("igarettes before him were narcotic .... Therefore so far as the record 
in this case is concerned the cigarettes found in the coat and in the car 
are brown paper cigarettes, no more." (116 Cal.App.2d at 750-751.) 
There was thus no evidence other than the admission of the c1river, one of 
the registered owners, that the vehicle was used illegally. For the same 
reasons that a conviction in a criminal proceeding cannot be had without 
proof of the corpu!l c1l'licti indepcnclently of admissions of the defendant 
(People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.~d 6U. 6!:!·1·6!:!ii [234 P.2d 1]) a forfeiture of 
a vehicle cannot be had without proof independently of admissions that 
a narcotic was in the car. There was therefore no basis for the forfeiture 
of even the driver's interest in the vehiele_ The rule ac1mitting declara-
tions of a state of mind was not invoked or considered in that case and 
it is therefore no authority one way or the other as to the application 
of that rule. 
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time of the declaration. (See Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252. 
255 1193 P. 251J ; Estate of Carson, 184 Cal. 437, 4-15 [194 
P. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239] ; Estate of. Anders01l, 185 Cal. 700, 718 
[198 P. 407].) [13] It has been held in this state, however. 
that under certain circumstances declarations are admissible 
to prove a state of mind at a particular time although uttered 
before or after that time, apparently on the theory that under 
these particular circumstances" [t] he stream of consciousness 
has enough continuity so that we may expect to find the same 
characteristics for some distance up or down the current." 
(Chafee, Progress of the Law-Evidence, 1919-1922, 35 Harv. 
L.Rev. 428, 444; Estate of McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17, 26 [30 P.101]; 
Estate of Ricks, 160 Cal. 450, 466 [117 P. 532] [declarations 
of testator after will was executed admissible to show mental 
condition at time it was executed]; Williams v. J{ idd, 170 
Cal. 631, 648 et seq. [151 P. 1, Ann.Cas. 1916E 703] ; Donahue 
v. Sweeney, 171 Cal. 388, 391-392 l153 P. 708] ; De CO'll v. 
Howell, 190 Cal. 741, 750 [214 P. 444] [declarations of 
grantor made after making a deed admissible on issue of 
delivery] ; Estate of Anderson, supra, 185 Cal. 700, 720 [dec-
larations of testatrix at a "not far distant time" after 
execution of will, that she then feared her aunt, admissible 
to show attitude toward her aunt at the time she executed 
will] ; Schooler v. Williamson, 192 Cal. 472, 476 [221 P. 195], 
[declarations of decedent made a week after the time of 
. alleged transfer to plaintiff that envelope and endorsement 
thereon were the ones referred to by him in a conversation 
two years earlier admissible to show intent of decedent in 
making such indorsement whenever it was made]; Whitlow 
v. Durst, 20 Ca1.2d 523, 525 [127 P.2d 530] [declarations of 
husband a few days after alleged reconciliation, admissible 
to show lack of intent to reconcile] ; Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 
28 Ca1.2d 154, 173-174 [168 P.2d 946] [declarations of de-
ceased owner of stock after transfer of stock admissible to 
show stock was to be held in trust] ; Estate of Sargavak, 35 
Ca1.2d 93, 96-98 [216 P.2d 850, 21 A.L.R.2d 307] [declara-
tions of decedent before and after execution of an instrument 
admissible to show intent with which it was executed] ; Casey 
v. Casey, 97 Cal.App.2d 875, 878-883 [218 P. 842] [declara-
tions of grantor before and after conveyance admissible to 
show whether she intended the grant as a gift or a trnst]. 
See 141 A.L.R. 704-710; McBaine, Admissibility in Califo1''¥l1'a 
01 Declarations 01 PhysicaJ, and Mental Condition, 19 Cal. 
622 PEOPLE V. ONE 1948 CHEVROLET CONV. CUUPE l4j C.2d 
L.Rev. 231, 367; McCormick on Evidence [1955] 466-467, 
567-570.} 
[lIb] In this case Phillips knew that he was arrested, he 
knew that the vehicle was seized because an occupant thereof 
possessed a narcotic. There was no reason to hold him under • arrest, if, prior thereto, he did not know of such possession, 
yet he not only did not disclaim such knowledge but while 
under arrest and at a time in close proximity to the arrest 
and seizure freely admitted his knowledge in the presence 
of the other suspects. Under the circumstances his statement 
was plainly relevant to show his knowledge at the time of 
the arrest and seizure. The matters admitted were within his 
special knowledge, the hearsay dangers of faulty perception 
and memory were not present, there was no apparent motive 
for misstatement, and the fact that his statement was not 
only against his interest in the possession of the vehicle as 
well as his mother's interest therein, but against his interest 
penally, gives reasonable assurance of his veracity. Under 
these circumstances Phillips' statement was admissible to 
prove that he knew at the time of the seizure of the vehicle 
that there was a narcotic therein. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
28, 1955. 
